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of Central Intelligence^]Deputy Director, Central Intelligence "Bridges to Eastern Europe."
memorandum is responsive tothat we identify some of the movesbe taken with respect to implementingpolicy of "building bridges across
the gulf which has divided us from Easternt is not intended as an exhaustive study of the many possibilities available.
Obviously some steps which might advance our interests with the current regimes in Eastern Europe might have adverse affects on the general population in the area. They might also have similar affects on our interests in other areas, for example in West Germany or in the USSR. In general we have not attempted to sort out and weigh the balance of Interests Involved in each case.
The memorandum also does not attempt to evaluate the chances of obtaining positive action by the US Congress in cases where legislative action might be necessary.
We have coordinated this paper with DD/P.
General Considerations
implementation of the policydramatic and flamboyant actions whichto generate suspicion or which would befor an Eastern European nation to accept.
A series of small steps that convey our intentions ond that do not create embarrassing politicalwould best serve Western interests. Even these must be subtly initiated.
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of tha annual Captive Nations Week resolution by the DS Congress. Zt is outdated, obviously resented, and Ignores the diversity ln Eastern Europe.
B.
Withdrawal of direct and indirect support of East European refugee groups and governmenta-in-oxlle. These organizations enjoy no political Influence in their native countries and could never serve as an acceptable nucleuson-Communist government. US support of these groups, moreover, carries tbe implication that they are an alternative government to that in power with which we would bo attempting toridge.
of the aodest effortstohe DSthat it will understandsituation in Easterncould leadesseningdiscrimination In thethe sale of goodsEastern Europe. It coulda favorable attitude intbe President's policy.
to any program ofis the easing or repeal of
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[restrictive legislation on dealingsCommunist countries, so tbat theagencies of the DScan deal with these states with greater flexibility. Dnder present law the extending of aid even for humanitarian purposes, auch as after the Skoplje earthquake, isand extremely difficult to arrange.
7. There are other general official actions DS can take which would not require any change exiatlng policies.
A. Tbe Department of State could clarify Immigration policy regarding people born in Eastern Europe who now are resident ln the free world and who have subsequently made trips behind tha Iron Curtain. Many such people erroneously fear they would lose the right to vialt or emigrate to the DS if theyeturn trip to their homeland. Western European citizens alao suffer under the same illusion.
Department of State couldin Eastern Europe USissuing visas to rank andof the Communist partyextant parties in Easternpartvdo not realizeeligible for DS visas underregulations.
could be nade for morehandling of requests by
US citizens of Eastern European origin who desire and need official help in making substantial gifts (such asay machine recently glvaa to Wroclaw Hospital ln Poland) to their hoaeland. Tho present process of arranging for delivery of such gifts is very laborious because the machinery of the Department
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Of State and other government agencies is not preparedto deal with such requests.
, US restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe and Communist emphasis on production for internal or intra-bloc use have kept commerce between the two areas far below its potential.
In recent years, however, all the Eastern European countries have shown growing interest in increasing their imports from the US, primarily of advanced technical equipment, but also ofand other products. Some of these goods are 'denied! the Eastern European countries by means of US export licensing restrictions. Moreover, tbe ability of these countries to pay for imports from the US is limited since they are denied access to commercial credit and are not accorded Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment. Partly for these reasons, and partly because of domestic economic priorities, the East European countries have notajor effort to develop production of goods marketable in the US. Tbe exceptions areandesser extent Poland, which have been treated much more liberally than the other countries of the area in regard to US export licensing. They receive normal commercial credits,redits, and MFN treatment. More liberal export policies and access to commercial credits also are being given to Rumania, which, however, does notery large short-term potential for exporting to the US.
10. Czechoslovakia probably has the most urgent need for increased trade with the West, including the US. Hungarian Interest ln Western machinery and equipment has increased. Bulgaria, the least developed of the Eastern European countries except for Albania,ital and continuing need for foreign equipment, technical assistance, and credits. The USSR has provided this support and recently grantedredit3 million. Bulgarian interest ln increased trade with the US, therefore, probably would be mainly long-term and devoid of great urgency.
c
ne way to increase DS trade withcountries without new legislationto liberalize DS licensing requirements
Bake available norma] commercial credits. Licensing; policy toward Eastern Europe, however, Involves questions of what constitutes "strategic goods" and of policy toward the Soviet Dnlon, which may have access to products and technology sold to Eastern Europe. Substantial expansion of trade wltb theso countries in tbe long term would require extension of MPN treatment to East European countries.
dissemination offairs and exhibitions, resident officesmeans of trade promotioneciprocalalso serve tbe general objective ofcontacts with Eastern Europe.
support for the accession ofcountries to tbe variouseconomic organizations, such asAgreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)International Monetary Fundightprovide additional forums for Bastwith Western countries, althoughnature of Soviet-type economicany meaningful adherence to thethese organizations.
tbe trade field,tourism and exchanges of delegations andstudents and professors could be
is another generalon the "bridge" policyhole. to avoid unnecessary competition with ourEuropean allies in certain Eastern By virtue of history andseveral NATO states are betterundertake some aspects of the "bridgecould be encouraged to expand their Whatever steps the DS may take towith Eastern Europe willthe policies of our NATO allies.
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ALBANIA
regime of party First Secretary Bnver
Hoxha is implacably hostile toward the West .nd isassistance from Communist h overtures the US couldwould not be rebuffed
to ^barrass the regime and toin the country's internal affairs. This was
lowlnH9?hr.Whe; thCthe disastrous Albanian floods
inu,te Albanianof living la so
Sropping below subsistence level. There may be opporruni?
e8 or
to Tir^ Ji ssistance
" th*
Am7wDSbuilding" programs would be hampered because the US does not have diplomatic
lllrl^lf "Uv Albanla- The only western cSuSSJesT
VsmItal*Turkey. Of these, Rome probably has the most extensive'relations '
ested6 Italians are Probably morethan the French or the Turks Inwith the
therefore, that tho US could underwrite certain programs in Albania to ^undertaken by the Italians. These could in-
health and sanitation programs.
of improved strainsand seed.
lltUe olse thatorn HmvJlV ecause ofenophobia of the Albanian regime, which
ifCOura*escontacts between its people and Westerners.
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ANNEX B
BULGARIA
r}"Albanian,
It n ltStoward the West
and chronically suspicious of US motives,in the cultural and political spheres.
'rief ^riod of relativein US-Bulgarian relationsreaction to the Goorgiev spyAlthougf,nrnhS? iD Bu3Baria to OUJd be KreGted warily, effortsconvention might be well re-
JS lDterested in expanding and might respond favor-
ably to US overtures. Offers of assistance to improve the technical level of Bulgarian agri-woulHrtiPrincipal economic problem, would tempt Sofia. Offers of agricultural tech-
f j er conservation and flood control Programs could be extended, or assistance inthe current 'wheat bug" problem.
^Bulgaria has also indicated an interest in obtaining the techniques of Westorn medical science, particularly in ophthalmology, cardiac diseases, and cancer. Offers of laboratory equipment might be well received.
offers of assistance, account must
be taken of Bulgarian sensitivities overand equality in international!Jrenuousfforts should beseemingly discriminatory policies.
Jherecently refused to permit the overflightsulgarian aircraft carrying a
America, although Sofia has allowedSAF support flights for the US Lega-
th* BulE"ia has refused the latest US requestupport flight.
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moat effective demonstration ofto improve relations withwould be tbe immediate conclusioneight-year-old claims negotiations. believe that the repeated delays andln the completion of theseconcern mainly nationalization claimsfrom the Communist takeover ofUS lack of interest inrelations. In this regard, theinclude delays by our alliesfor certain goldinto tbe hands of old-time hard-liners ln
the regime who havo opposed the policy ofrelations with the West.
Once these negotiations aro concluded, Prague would probably become more amenable to other types of proposals from the US and the West. One of the first subsequent steps mightonsular agreement providing for consulates in Bratislava and New York (or Chicago or Cleveland).
Czechoslovakia has been experiencing serious economic setbacks aod isigh priority in its current plans to the attainment of high technical, standards. Consequently, there are unusually good reasons at present for Czechoslovakia to be interested in increasing its imports from the West (including thehere much of the best equipment is available, and in gaining greater access to Western technical information and markets. The desire for trade with tho West may therefore become Important enough to lead to negotiations similar to the recent Rumanian-US talks.
Economic difficulties have also led to Czech consideration of numerous changes toits economic system, and to widespreadof broad economic issues. ThiB hasopened the door somewhat to Western ideas and is likely to provide many opportunities for
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a further increase in Western influence,media as exchanges of technicians,
flt. 5- Participation in the Brno Trade Fair and other trade exhibits could be expanded. could be given to ensuring that exhibited products which the Czechs might wish to order can obtain export permits by the Commerce Department (this bas not been the case in the past). the Czechs could be invited to participate in trade or technical exhibits outside at least for the sake of expanding contracts if not -for actual trade itself.
COuld eDCOuraefl joint projectswestern European countries and Czechoslovakia
zech_Austrlan canalization of the Morava
7. The Czech regime will continue to beand fearful of the influences of Western culture on its sophisticated, Western-oriented, dissatisfied youth and on the population in general. Nonetheless, it hasosition in favor of increased contacts on an ideologically competitive basis. Continuing efforts therefore could be made to expand cultural relationsrivate or serai-private basis. Prague itself has suggestedvisits by groups of journalists. US artists and performers touring Europe also could be encouraged to visit Czechoslovakia, where musicians and composers are particularly welcomed. Some progress has beon made in academic exchanges and more could be done if the OS were willing to permit Czechoslovaks to study in the US withoutuid pro quo. Tbe Czechoslovak public is sports-minded and has responded well to visits by athletic groups, but more attention should be paid to sending top caliber athletes.
8. The Czechs recently agreed with the Austrians and began talks with the British for an exchange of TV programs. DS attempts to arrange such exchanges have failed in the past, but future tries might prove successful if the DS offered cultural rather than political programs.
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9. The regime reacted favorably to an Embassy .of assistance in teaching English.
u(bYl)
could pursue this and eventually use the Embassy
libraryeading room for such classes.
has greatly easedfor visiting Westerners, so thatis relatively easy and Inexpensive. the cultural-psychological value ofcontacts through tourism, the promotion
or encouragement of US tourism to Czechoslovakia would add western currency to Czech coffers, giving them greater wherewithal to deal commercially with the US.
more important to the US,Czechoslovak tourism in the US. Thehas eased the regulations so that acan travel to the US if he has anif he or the host can pay his expensesCzechoslovak border in western currency.
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ANNEX D
EAST GERMAN?
a general proposition, theof Germany renders all but impossibleto effect the President's "bridge"respect to East Germany. Barring apeace settlement and Germana reversal of the US policy of non-recognition,
we are dependent on the West Germans, including the West Berllners, and on various internationalof which do not include the East Germans among theirrepresent Western interests toward the East Germans.
The Federal Republic is loathe to deal on any official level with the Ulbricht regime and prefers to use non-governmental channels such as the Interzonal Trade mechanism or the Evangelical Church. There is at present, however, noin the Federal Republic on how to ameliorate the plight of the East Germans or how best to deal with the Communist regime in East Berlin.
Recourse to international bodies, except for humanitarian aid channeled through theRed Cross in times of disaster, would require that the US no longer actively oppose the accession of the East Germans to many of those bodies and that, in fact, it join with the USSR in supporting the admission of both the GDB and the Federal Republicasis of parity.
Short of this, it might prove feasible to restudy NATO policy on non-bloc travel byEast Germans who at present are required to obtain Temporary Travel Documents to visit or transit NATO states and who are automatically denied such documents if travelling in any official capacity whatsoever. olicy of issuing TTD'3
to all applicants, individually and regardless of whatever mission they nay assume at their ultimate destination, would facilitate travel to non-bloc areas and might stimulate the exchange of Ideas.
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HUNGARY
relations nave long beenby tbe problem of Cardinalln the US Legation In Budapest. this problemrecondition for theof US-Bungarlan relations. The US,not officially regard the Mlndszenty case as
a bilateral issue; rather, lt isatter for Hungarian-Vatican negotiations.
are, however, certain interimcan be taken, regardless of the Such steps would be designed to convey
US good faith and encourage the development of Hungarian Initiatives towards tho Vest. These moves could be responsive to overtures Hungary has already made to the US, including US construction of hotel and tourist facilities in Budapest, and establishmentungarian State Tourist Agency (IBUSZ) office In the US. In tho important field of agriculture, Hungary has sought an exchange of technological Information.
contacts could be enhanced by
a program of visitors' grants for potentiallyHungarian professionals, patterned after tbe successful program established with Poland. Subsequent efforts could include the wideof an American magazine ln Hungary andencouragement for the exchange of more technicalnot necessarilyuid pro quowell as theof artistic exchanges.
oncourage an expansion of tradeUS could encourage US firms to participate
in exhibits and trade fairs in Hungary; make Hungarian exhibitors welcome ln the United States; and give detailed advice on meeting US standards on such matters as imports of neat products. As these contacts expand, negotiations should be undertaken toasis for granting industrial credits to Hungary.
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POLAND
1. 7 tho United States, with the qualified agreement of the Gomulka regime, has established diverse economic and cultural relations with Poland. Poland'sit Is subject toan opportunity for further US initiatives. Poland has alsoparallel relations with West European countries, offering the possibility of Joint DS-West European efforts to "build bridges."
entry intobyUS encouragement ofto liberalize trade with PolandPoland's desire to expand andtraditionally narrow range of exports toWest. West Germany has alreadypartial willingnoss to meet Polish requests
to this effect.
The Fronch, Italians, and British have been Interested ln granting long-term credits to Warsaw for Homo time. The US might well reexamine the present five-year maximum it imposes oncredits under existing law.
Existing provisions for US useolish zlotys constituting partial repayment of US credits, could be broadened, permitting an expansion of US activities in Poland to be financed by this fund. The currently thriving US public health program financed from this source, and involving Joint projects and exchanges of personnel, could be expanded in the areas ofand possibly public information. Theof USIA could be sought to provide
yet another outlet for US activities in Poland.
Joint agricultural projects such as the establishment of an agricultural research center in Poland, supplying US techniques and translations of US agricultural literature, as well ason organization, management and distribution could also be considered.
Tho joint US-Polish fishing enterprise which has just been established could bo followed
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by further coordlanted efforts lo the fishingwith the West Europeans, particularly the Scandinavians. Polish agreements with Denmark, for example,asis for other agreements, possiblyolish-British fishingfor exploiting and marketing ocean products.
has agreed to negotiate awith the United States, and plans areway to arrange for additional consulates. be profitable to move the existing USPoznan to Szczecin. US interest in thePoland's western frontiers could thus bewithout explicit recognition. Acould be achievedoint US-Westproject for the development of theain trade port for landlockedcountries.
all, the most effective andtoridge" to Poland would be anpersonal statement by thoto that of President De Gaulle,permanency of Poland's Oder-Neissewould compliesto Khrushchev's problemsraising the question of Poland's It would also, however, complicatewith tho Federal Republic of Germany.
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Z. Given the momentum of OS-Rumanian relations, the worsening of Rumanian-Soviet relations, and the vigorous regime-sponsored revival of Rumanianthe US will have to be cautious lest its overtures and Bucharest's responsos exceed the limits the Soviet bloc will tolerate. eriod of consolidation, the US could take the initiative in the whole area of cultural, scientific, and technical relations.
2. Rumaniaradition of cooperation with the French, and during the inter-war period Rumania joined the French alliance system. Bocauso of strains in US-French relations, Washington would be well advised for the time being to avoid any joint actions with Paris toward Rumania. On the other hand, joint initiatives might well be undertaken with tbe British or tho West Germans, both of whom areivoly interest lncontacts with Bucharest. The broad contoxt of US efforts toward Rumania should be that used to meet the problems underdeveloped states face in tho process of rapid industrialization.
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The question in US-Yugoslav relations is less one of building bridges than of restoring those undercut during theears by the US Congress in reacting to Belgrade's pro-Soviet neutralism. The initial US effort must be directed, therefore, toward re-establishing the degree of flexibility necessary for profitable dealings with Belgrade.
Once this has been accomplished, the key area for immediate action is the resumption of sales of new or spare parts for military equipment of US origin. In the absence of US willingness to sell, Belgrade has turned to Moscow, which has by now become the major supplier of new equipment.
has acute balance of The US could earn considerable goodfurther pressing Western economicas GATT, for sympathetic considerationneeds.
Yugoslav relations with the USrestored to something closer to thethey once achieved, thereide range
of programs the US could undertake. The Yugoslavs are already admirers of and receptive to Western business practices and could be approached in such fields as advertising, corporate organization and management, and incentives for industrial workers. Since Yugoslavia will increasingly be facing the problems common to industrial societies, assistance in the development of such disciplines as human relations could also be rendered.
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Ambassador Kennan notes that OS policy toward Yugoslavia after Belgrade's break with the Soviet bloc8 was designed to encourage divisive forces within the bloc and toiberal pro-Western domestic evolution Int was not designed to lead to the overthrow of the Tito regime.
Kennan concludes that this policy was generally successfully pursued Although it did not produce "any groat changes in Tito's view of himselfugoslavia's domestic institutions and foreign policies becamedifferent from thoso "of the real Communist countries." With Tito graduallyess active role in Yugoslav affairs, there was even the prospectore forthcoming policy toward us.
Kennan next reviews the collapse of OS policy brought about by the independent actions of Congress and militant American anti-Communist groups, pointing out that Belgrade can only conclude that it is being punished because it calls itself Communist and not for any particular anti-OSugoslav officials seem to havo drawn the lesson that the price of good relations with the OS is renouncing their political past, placing in question the legititimacy of their regime, and denouncing their belief in socialism.
Kennan states that US policy toward Yugoslavia has neverroad understanding or commitment outside the working level in the Department of State. It has had powerful enemies, moreover, in right-wing American and refugee groups, with their religious and Congressional supporters and spokesmen. In addition, the press has failed to provide adequate coverage of Yugoslavia.
* DS Embassy Belgrade,,2 (LOU)
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correct the situation, Kennan advocatesfreedom of action by the Executive Branch through repeal of recent anti-Yugoslav legislation. Next, an effectivedoes not specifyYugoslavia must be reconstructed. with both theseajor educational effort must bo launched toward tho public, tho press, the Congress and its staffs, and the variousof the Executive Branch. Short of this, Kennan believes we had better "fold our tents" before "the Yugoslavs do it for us."
Original document.
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